An argument for the existence of God is called a teleological argument if it claims that the best explanation for something's existence is that God designed it. For example, Antony Flew started believing in God because he thought the molecular mechanisms in our cells that replicate DNA were designed by God. Isaac Newton argued that God is the best explanation for the symmetry of living things, and the best explanation for the fact that the orbits of the planets do not allow them to collide.
Some teleological arguments tend to be vulnerable to two main objections, the God-of-the-gaps objection and the who-designed-the-designer objection.
First objection: The God-of-the-gaps
This is the objection that if you infer God as an explanation for things we don't understand, then he becomes less necessary as we understand more. For example, many people today find Newton's argument (see my first paragraph) unconvincing. We would rather explain the symmetry of living things using evolution than a designer. And we would rather say the planets do not collide because by now the only planets left are those whose orbits do not allow them to collide. You could say that Newton used God to fill a gap which has since been filled by something else.
There are still things which science has not explained, but suppose science were allowed to progress for an infinite amount of time with infinite resources. In principle, could all explanatory gaps which are filled by God get filled by something else?
Second objection: Who designed the designer?
This is the objection that a designer must be more complicated that the thing he designed. In chapter 4 of The God Delusion, Richard Dawkins writes that if God designed the universe then he would have to be at least as complicated as the universe. Dawkins says that instead of suggesting God, we should prefer an explanation that starts with something simple and gradually adds complexity. He states that Darwinism "teaches us to seek out graded ramps of slowly increasing complexity".
I disagree with Dawkins. I believe it is logically impossible for something to be more complicated that its complete set of causes. We will look at why later below.
An argument that avoids both objections
Theists have given counter-arguments to these two objections. To the God-of-the-gaps objection, theists usually respond that some gaps in principle cannot be explained physically. For example, the existence of space and time. Or they argue that some things require a designer because we understand them, not because we don't. To the who-designed-the-designer objection, some theists reply that God is simple, not made of parts.
However, I don't want to make those counter-arguments here. In this article, I want to construct a new teleological argument that is immune to both the god-of-the-gaps objection and the who-designed-the-designer objection. I want to simply avoid the objections, instead of fight them. My argument will rest on the following sentence:
If X is the complete sets of causes of Y, then X must contain Y, or else X is not actually complete.
Here is my argument:
Let X be anything that exists. For instance, a phone, an antelope, or a planet.
Let Y be the complete set of causes of X. Note that Y is not some of the causes of X, but the complete set of causes of X.
We draw 4 conclusions about X and Y:
I asked you which explanation you would choose in a thought-experiment. But this experiment has, in fact, already been done in reality. We have actually grown up, all of us, in a kind of cave where objects really do fly around and all have exactly the same speed and mass as each other - we call them photons. Unless you can point to some significant difference between photons and the fictional objects flying around in the cave, there is no reason your conclusion about the photons should be different from your conclusion about the objects in the cave.
This argument sums up why I don't believe any process can well and truly start from simplicity and end with complexity, as Dawkins claims.
Let Y be the complete set of causes of X. Note that Y is not some of the causes of X, but the complete set of causes of X.
We draw 4 conclusions about X and Y:
1. X must be unavoidable given Y. We know this because if X were avoidable given Y, then Y would not be the complete set of causes of X. There would be something missing from Y that was required to get X.
2. Y contains X. If Y does not effectively contain X then Y is not the complete set of causes of X. There was something missing from Y that was required to get X.
3. Y must be at least as improbable as X. Whenever we have Y, we must have X, so the probability of Y is at most the probability of X.
4. Y must be at least as complicated as X. To prove this, think what would happen if Y were less complicated than X: We would have a change in complexity, and change requires something like time. Therefore X and Y must both exist inside something like a timeline. Inside this timeline, consider the changes that happen in-between Y and X. Those changes must be included in Y, since they contributed to X. Therefore Y cannot exist at any point before X. Y must include the timeline and all changes that are applied right up until we get X. Therefore Y must be as complicated as X.
Notice that these four conclusions seem like different ways of making the same claim. I have never seen this claim refuted, but I have encountered many objections to it. These objections are normally examples of things which seem at first to be more complex than their complete set of causes. Here are three such objections, along with my reasons for believing they do not harm my claim:
Objection 1: When an unzipped file comes from a zipped file, the zipped file is simpler that the unzipped file. That is an example in which the result is more complex that all of its causes.
2. Y contains X. If Y does not effectively contain X then Y is not the complete set of causes of X. There was something missing from Y that was required to get X.
3. Y must be at least as improbable as X. Whenever we have Y, we must have X, so the probability of Y is at most the probability of X.
4. Y must be at least as complicated as X. To prove this, think what would happen if Y were less complicated than X: We would have a change in complexity, and change requires something like time. Therefore X and Y must both exist inside something like a timeline. Inside this timeline, consider the changes that happen in-between Y and X. Those changes must be included in Y, since they contributed to X. Therefore Y cannot exist at any point before X. Y must include the timeline and all changes that are applied right up until we get X. Therefore Y must be as complicated as X.
Apparent counter-examples to this argument
Notice that these four conclusions seem like different ways of making the same claim. I have never seen this claim refuted, but I have encountered many objections to it. These objections are normally examples of things which seem at first to be more complex than their complete set of causes. Here are three such objections, along with my reasons for believing they do not harm my claim:
Objection 1: When an unzipped file comes from a zipped file, the zipped file is simpler that the unzipped file. That is an example in which the result is more complex that all of its causes.
Why I disagree: To get the unzipped file you need more than just the zipped file. You also need a computer programmed with unzipping instructions and you need it to apply those instructions to the zipped file. Therefore the zipped file is not the complete set of causes of the unzipped file. In everyday life it is convenient to say that zipped files "contain" larger files, but this is technically not true - we say it because we take for granted that anyone who hears us already know about the unzipping instructions required.
Objection 2: There are simulations, for example Conway's game of Life, which start with very simple data and apply very simple rules over time, to end up with very complicated data. In this example, the result is more complex that all of its causes.
Objection 2: There are simulations, for example Conway's game of Life, which start with very simple data and apply very simple rules over time, to end up with very complicated data. In this example, the result is more complex that all of its causes.
Why I disagree: As we saw in the previous example, to get the complex pattern at the end you need more than just the simple pattern at the start. You also need a computer programmed with the rules of Conway's game of Life, and you need it to apply those rules to the starting pattern.
Objection 3: Life on earth is very complicated, yet it originated from a simpler self-replicating cell. In this example, the result is more complex that all of its causes.
Objection 3: Life on earth is very complicated, yet it originated from a simpler self-replicating cell. In this example, the result is more complex that all of its causes.
Why I disagree: The first self-replicating cell is not enough to give us life on earth today. To get to life on earth today we need evolution, and evolution requires nature to obey laws. For example, the law of gravity means that giraffes with longer necks will be more likely to eat, and therefore reproduce, than their siblings with shorter necks. So the next generation of giraffes will on average have slightly longer necks. The same will happen to the next generation, and all generations after that. This is dependent on the law of gravity being consistent over many generations of giraffe. Evolution requires far more than the first self-replicating cell: It requires some mechanism to enforce physical rules consistently over multiple generations.
(Mathematicians might notice that these three objections are about things with high "raw" complexity, but low Kolmogorov complexity. For example, the final pattern in Conway's game of life has high "raw" complexity because it takes you a long time to describe pixel by pixel, but it has low Kolmogorov complexity because it takes a short time to describe the start pattern along with the instructions required to get the final pattern.
The trouble is that, if something has high "raw" complexity but low Kolmogorov complexity, that will be because the Kolmogorov complexity states something which must be repeated, and in the next paragraph we argue that this means some mechanism has to repeat it.)
(Mathematicians might notice that these three objections are about things with high "raw" complexity, but low Kolmogorov complexity. For example, the final pattern in Conway's game of life has high "raw" complexity because it takes you a long time to describe pixel by pixel, but it has low Kolmogorov complexity because it takes a short time to describe the start pattern along with the instructions required to get the final pattern.
The trouble is that, if something has high "raw" complexity but low Kolmogorov complexity, that will be because the Kolmogorov complexity states something which must be repeated, and in the next paragraph we argue that this means some mechanism has to repeat it.)
Overview: Laws of physics must be enforced to avoid contradicting claim about X and Y. How does that help? It doesn't but it shows the who designed the designer problem applies not just to designers. And God is also a preferable solution because...
Also look at fb conversation with James
Are the laws of physics "natural", or are they caused by something?
You may not be satisfied by my answer to Objection 3. Maybe you are unconvinced that rules require some mechanism to enforce them. To many people, it seems that the laws of physics happen naturally, without any mechanism. In this section, I want to provide two reasons for believing a mechanism is required to enforce them:First reason to think the laws of physics are caused.
Suppose one day you and a companion discover a new underground cave. On exploring, you discover hundreds of objects flying through the air inside the cave. You do not know what they are made out of. You do not know anything about them except their size, and that they all move in straight lines except for when they bounce on the cave's wall. After a few days of measuring their speed and weight, you and your companion discover that they all have exactly the same speed and mass as each other, to as many decimal places as you can measure. What would you think of this behaviour? There are only two explanations. The first explanation is that each object is travelling at its own randomly chosen speed, and that all those speeds happen, by chance, to be the same. The second explanation is that someone or something is forcing them to do this.
I will assume that you and your companion would both choose the second explanation. That something is forcing them to do this. At this point, suppose your companion says "It is the nature of the object that forces them to do this. No external explanation necessary." How would you respond?
I asked you which explanation you would choose in a thought-experiment. But this experiment has, in fact, already been done in reality. We have actually grown up, all of us, in a kind of cave where objects really do fly around and all have exactly the same speed and mass as each other - we call them photons. Unless you can point to some significant difference between photons and the fictional objects flying around in the cave, there is no reason your conclusion about the photons should be different from your conclusion about the objects in the cave.
Second reason to think the laws of physics are caused.
Suppose the laws of physics did not need anything to enforce them. That would contradict our claim above. We would have a situation where Y contained X, yet was less complicated than X. In every other apparent counter-example to our claim, it turns out there is "something enforcing the rules" which actually makes Y more complicated than X. It is special pleading to say that our universe is different, just because we happen to be inside it (for that is the only difference between our universe and a simulation such as Conway's game of life).
The problem
By now many will have spotted the obvious problem.
This argument sums up why I don't believe any process can well and truly start from simplicity and end with complexity, as Dawkins claims.
A possible solution
However, I agree with Dawkins that this leaves us with a problem: The ultimate cause of the universe must be at least as complicated as the universe. So what could it be? Philosophers divide objects into contingent things and necessary things. For contingent things, being complex means being improbable. The same does not apply to necessary things since necessary things (if they exist) are not improbable. So probably the ultimate cause of the universe is something necessary.
I also have a suggestion. I cannot prove this, but it is a suggestion. We do not know what something would look like if it were not controlled by any laws, since everything that we know about has been controlled by a law. I argue here that such a thing must exist:
http://timcrinion.blogspot.com/2020/05/god-is-one.html
http://timcrinion.blogspot.com/2020/05/god-is-one.html
My suggestion here is that God is all-powerful, not because he is constructed in a complicated way, out of separate parts, but because he is simple: His definition is simply that he is not restricted by any laws, and there is no separation in him.
It is often assumed that something not restricted by any laws (eg the whole of existence) would not have any abilities, for abilities in the physical world seem to belong to complicated things: Organisms and machines have abilities because they are complicated, and the more abilities they have, the more complicated they seem to be. By this reasoning, something not restricted by any laws would be very simple (its definition is "not restricted by laws") and therefore would have little power or ability. How would it think without the machinery of something like transistors or neurons?
However, no one can imagine what it is like for something to not be restricted by laws. Yet something is: the whole of existence. I'm suggesting the whole of existence may be all powerful precisely because it is simple and not restricted by laws. But that is only a guess.
It is often assumed that something not restricted by any laws (eg the whole of existence) would not have any abilities, for abilities in the physical world seem to belong to complicated things: Organisms and machines have abilities because they are complicated, and the more abilities they have, the more complicated they seem to be. By this reasoning, something not restricted by any laws would be very simple (its definition is "not restricted by laws") and therefore would have little power or ability. How would it think without the machinery of something like transistors or neurons?
However, no one can imagine what it is like for something to not be restricted by laws. Yet something is: the whole of existence. I'm suggesting the whole of existence may be all powerful precisely because it is simple and not restricted by laws. But that is only a guess.
Machines that are made of parts are complicated because parts of the machine which are separate need to be connected. These connections between separate things make the machine more complex. However, the connections make the machine more like a single thing than separate unconnected things. Ironically, they make the machine more similar to God, who is not made of parts and contains no separation. But God is different from the machines: He has no parts. You might call him the only uncomplicated thing: For machines have laws above them to govern their parts, whereas God simply has no laws above him. We don't know what something would look like if it were not restricted by laws, so maybe it would be unrestricted and all-powerful, without needing laws or parts or things to make it unrestricted. Unrestricted might be the "default setting".
In short, things are defined by their limitations. If God is not limited, then his definition (all-powerful, all-knowing) then he is simple.
This seems compatible with the ontological argument. The ontological argument states that the definition of God is of something so perfect, that God cannot fail to exist. This means God exists necessarily, not contingently. While many find the ontological argument unconvincing, I believe it is useful for explaining *how* God might exist without a cause, or neurones, or transistors, and this makes him a good candidate for where this complexity may have originated from.
In short, things are defined by their limitations. If God is not limited, then his definition (all-powerful, all-knowing) then he is simple.
This seems compatible with the ontological argument. The ontological argument states that the definition of God is of something so perfect, that God cannot fail to exist. This means God exists necessarily, not contingently. While many find the ontological argument unconvincing, I believe it is useful for explaining *how* God might exist without a cause, or neurones, or transistors, and this makes him a good candidate for where this complexity may have originated from.
It also seems compatible with the way existence works: For nations, organizations, and machines have more power the more unified their parts are, the more they are a single thing. For it is miscommunication between individuals that causes groups to fail, it is miscommunication between nerve cells that causes brains to fail, and it is miscommunication between parts in a machine that causes the machine to fail. I am reluctant to try to define God, since it is not possible, but an attempt might be to say that there is no separation in him, and he is not controlled by anything, and has full control of other things.
